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Life or death decisions shouldn't resemble third grade math tests

Standardized tests are imperfect things. We accept this when colleges weigh SAT scores against recommendation letters. We nod knowingly when job applicants with identical credentials produce wildly different Myers Briggs results. Yet in Alabama courtrooms, a single digit IQ score now determines whether the state may legally strap a human being to a gurney and pump lethal chemicals into their veins. Somewhere, Pythagoras is spinning in his grave.

The case currently before the Supreme Court presents a collision between judicial efficiency and scientific reality. At issue is Alabama's practice of using a strict 70 IQ threshold to determine intellectual disability in capital cases. Defendants scoring 71 or above face execution. Those scraping in at 70 or below escape the needle. It's less a legal standard than a perverse game show where the price is wrong.

This numerical absolutism flies against decades of psychological consensus. Modern psychometrics recognizes IQ tests as imperfect tools with margins of error, generally around five points in either direction. A person scoring 75 might functionally possess the mental capacity of someone scoring 70. Environmental factors, testing conditions, and educational background further muddy the waters. Yet Alabama's approach resembles less a serious evaluation of cognitive ability than a teenager rounding pi to 3.0 for convenience.

The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in 2002's Atkins v Virginia decision. That landmark ruling prohibited executing intellectually disabled individuals as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. While morally unambiguous, the opinion left room for interpretation regarding how states should determine disability. Many hoped subsequent decisions would reinforce the scientific approach. Instead, the current case illustrates how states seized that flexibility to evade rather than engage with medical reality.

Alabama's solution involves what critics call score slicing. Rather than acknowledging IQ's statistical margin of error by considering a range, courts mechanically apply individual results regardless of context. If a defendant's highest score exceeds 70 after multiple tests, lower results may be disregarded regardless of mitigating factors like testing conditions or childhood trauma. Imagine if your doctor ignored five blood pressure readings showing hypertension because one measurement fell within normal range. The practice prioritizes bureaucratic convenience over meaningful examination.

Against this backdrop, the case of Joseph Smith lays bare the system's absurdity. Over two decades of testing produced IQ scores spanning 72 to 78. While potentially indicating borderline intellectual functioning, clinical practice would typically consider such consistent sub 80 scores alongside adaptive functioning deficits in assessing disability. Alabama instead took the highest number available and called it justice. This approach assumes an alarming premise that fundamental rights should be governed by the same logic as carnival ring toss games. Close enough doesn't count unless you're holding a syringe.

The human cost of this legal arithmetic cannot be overstated. While Mr. Smith's particular circumstances remain complex, the precedent set could impact potentially dozens awaiting capital sentences. Studies suggest up to 10 of death row inmates may meet clinical criteria for intellectual disability. These individuals often possess diminished culpability from the start due to cognitive limitations impacting their understanding of actions and consequences. Their execution serves neither retribution nor deterrence. It merely codifies our willingness to sacrifice the vulnerable for procedural neatness.

Beyond death rows, the case carries implications for how American jurisprudence engages with scientific advancement. The Atkins decision recognized evolving standards of decency as foundational to Eighth Amendment interpretation. Yet when courts selectively ignore scientific consensus on testing methodology, we risk legal frameworks becoming fossilized. Under Alabama's system, a defendant evaluated with 1980s testing protocols might face execution under less accurate standards than those available today. This creates perverse incentives against judicial modernization.

Conservatives rightly worry about judicial overreach in policy matters best left to legislatures. Progressives understandably fear dilution of constitutional protections through state level chicanery. Yet neither philosophy should tolerate reducing complex neurological questions to beneath the decimal point. Our justice system frequently employs gray areas whether reasonable doubt standards or sentencing discretion. To abandon that nuance here suggests intellectual inconsistency at best and moral cowardice at worst.

Solutions exist for those willing to seek them. States might adopt the position taken by professional organizations like the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. Their guidelines emphasize clinical judgment alongside testing, considering three criteria intellectual functioning, adaptive behavior deficits, and early onset of disability. Alternatively, legislatures could establish an evidentiary presumption favoring defendants whose IQ scores fall near the margin of error. Such approaches maintain states rights while aligning with medical ethics.

The current Supreme Court leans conservative, yet shows occasional skepticism toward government overreach in capital cases. Recent decisions barred executing individuals unable to understand their sentences or those convicted of non lethal crimes. This provides cautious optimism for nuanced rulings even amidst shifting judicial philosophies. As Justice O'Connor once observed during oral arguments for an earlier death penalty case, The judiciary acts as a refuge for those who cannot protect themselves. Alabama's mechanistic approach would undermine that sacred function.

Ultimately, America must decide whether death penalty administration requires certainty or convenience. Perhaps our children will look back in horror that we ever conflated intellectual disability evaluations with video game high score competitions. Until then, the placement of decimal points will determine who lives and who dies. Only in courtrooms could so dark an absurdity seem normal.

Disclaimer: This article reflects the author’s personal opinions and interpretations of political developments. It is not affiliated with any political group and does not assert factual claims unless explicitly sourced. Readers should approach all commentary with critical thought and seek out multiple perspectives before drawing conclusions.

George OxleyBy George Oxley