
There is a children's game involving wooden blocks where players carefully remove pieces from an increasingly unstable tower. It is generally understood that the point lies not in keeping the structure standing, but in pretending you intended collapse all along when your turn inevitably destabilizes everything. Observing recent Supreme Court arguments about presidential power over independent agencies felt eerily similar, only with more Latin phrases and fewer giggling eight year olds.
The judicial winds suggest a majority may be ready to grant presidents greater authority to remove heads of agencies historically designed to operate with some independence from political winds. For those who have spent years advocating for trimming bureaucratic overreach, this smells like victory. For others, it conjures images of dominos falling across the regulatory landscape. The truth likely resides somewhere in between, which is where most uncomfortable truths tend to lurk.
Independent agencies occupy a peculiar space in American governance, these peculiar entities born of Progressive Era idealism and New Deal pragmatism. The Federal Reserve determines monetary policy without daily White House input. The Federal Trade Commission investigates corporate malfeasance regardless of which party appointed its commissioners. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a more recent creation, wields enforcement powers insulated from abrupt leadership changes. Their semi autonomous status stems from the theory that certain decisions interest rates, antitrust actions, utility regulations benefit from stability beyond electoral cycles.
Critics counter that no government authority should operate beyond democratic accountability. If voters entrust a president with executive power, that power should not be artificially constrained by layers of tenured bureaucrats pursuing personal agendas. It is a compelling argument, especially when summoned during Senate confirmation hearings or cable news segments about regulations gone awry. The tension between expertise and accountability defines much of modern governance, after all. We want specialists deciding antibiotic approval protocols at the FDA, just not when those protocols delay drugs we personally need.
The current legal challenge brewing before the Court centers on whether presidents may remove agency heads at will, or only under specific circumstances like misconduct. At stake is not any single administration's preferences, but the architectural integrity of the administrative state itself. Presidents have long grumbled about independent agencies, comparing them to rogue operatives when their rulings prove inconvenient. What changes now is the judicial appetite for reconsidering settled precedent.
Legal observers note a philosophical shift among certain justices toward reasserting Article II executive authority. Textualism, the judicial lens focusing strictly on constitutional wording, leaves little room for implied congressional constraints on presidential removal power. This view opens fascinating questions about how aggressively the Court might reshape agency independence. Would it extend to institutions like the Fed or SEC? Or would new rulings apply narrowly, creating a staggered transformation? Between oral arguments and written opinions lies a chasm of uncertainty.
Predicting outcomes remains risky business, but several arguments floated during hearings proved telling. One justice mused that restricting removal power forces presidents to oversee departments using ‘forbidden means’ outside official channels. Another queried whether insulated bureaucrats could become ‘a fourth branch of government’ answerable to no one, an ancient fear dressed in modern rhetoric. Such lines of inquiry reveal deeper concerns about unbalanced power.
Lurking beneath the legal theories and Latin maxims are practical consequences for ordinary citizens. Agency independence directly impacts mortgage disclosures enforced by the CFPB, utility rates overseen by FERC, workplace safety violations investigated by OSHA. Presidential control brings popular accountability to these domains, which sounds excellent until you realize most voters cannot name three cabinet secretaries let alone obscure commission chairs. The notion that White House oversight inherently makes agencies more democratically responsive relies on an idealized version of civic engagement that rarely materializes.
Historical precedent offers valuable perspective. When past presidents attempted heavy handed interventions in independent agencies, the results often disappointed their ambitions. Bureaucratic inertia and institutional resistance proved formidable opponents even when legal authority existed. The Post Office endured presidential tirades about package rates for years while changing almost nothing. Some inspectors general investigated administration allies reluctantly despite removal threats. Personnel is policy, goes the old adage, but personnel also possess their own ideas about policy.
Corporate America watches these proceedings with understandable ambivalence. Business leaders routinely complain about overregulation while quietly appreciating regulatory certainty. A Wall Street banker prefers predictable SEC enforcement patterns even when they occasionally sting. An erratic agency fluctuating with presidential moods creates planning nightmares. Investors tolerate known rules, however annoying. They panic when the rulebook gets rewritten after every leadership change. Stability, it turns out, has its own economic value.
The path ahead remains murky, but certain realities shine through the fog. First, presidential power accretes more readily than it recedes. Granting any chief executive greater authority over agencies creates expectations for future administrations. Second, legal changes unfold slowly within systems designed for incrementalism. Even a sweeping Supreme Court ruling would face implementation delays through lower courts, agency resistance, and congressional countermoves. Finally, the administrative state’s resilience is legendary. Civil servants mastered the art of passive resistance before most justices were born.
Reasonable observers can disagree about whether stronger presidential oversight would enhance accountability or enable overreach. The wiser course may be focusing less on theoretical powers and more on practical checks. Perhaps new transparency measures ensuring agencies explain controversial decisions. Maybe faster congressional review processes for significant regulations. Better metrics for evaluating agency effectiveness beyond partisan outrage cycles. Real reform addresses how power functions, not just who holds its levers.
For now, the wooden blocks remain midair. Players circle the tower, calculating their next moves. One certainty emerges from these deliberations: bureaucratic Jenga never ends gracefully, but the game continues long after today's participants have left the table.
By George Oxley